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In this essay, we aim to counter and qualify the epiphenomenalist challenge proposed
in this special issue on the grounds of empirical and theoretical arguments. The current
body of scientific knowledge strongly indicates that conscious thought is a necessary
condition for many human behaviors, and therefore, consciousness qualifies as a cause
of those behaviors. We review illustrative experimental evidence for the causal power
of conscious thought while also acknowledging its natural limitations. We argue that
it is implausible that the metabolic costs inherent to conscious processes would have
evolved in humans without any adaptive benefits. Moreover, we discuss the relevance
of conscious thought to the issue of freedom. Many accounts hold conscious thought
as necessary and conducive to naturalistic conceptions of personal freedom. Apart
from these theories, we show that the conscious perception of freedom and the belief
in free will provide sources of interesting findings, beneficial behavioral effects, and
new avenues for research. We close by proposing our own challenge via outlining
the gaps that have yet to be filled to establish hard evidence of an epiphenomenal
model of consciousness. To be sure, we appreciate the epiphenomenalist challenge as
it promotes critical thinking and inspires rigorous research. However, we see no merit
in downplaying the causal significance of consciousness a priori. Instead, we believe it
more worthwhile to focus on the complex interplay between conscious and other causal
processes.
Keywords: consciousness, conscious thoughts, epiphenomenalism, freedom, belief in free will
INTRODUCTION
Everyday experience furnishes the strong impression that conscious thoughts such as decisions,
plans, and intentions play an important role in causing behavior. Epiphenomenalism challenges
that impression. An epiphenomenon is defined as a byproduct of other processes that does not
itself cause anything. In philosophy, epiphenomenalism proposes that human conscious thought
has no causal influence on the physical world, including human action. Huxley (1874) compared
human conscious thought to a steam whistle on an engine: something that results from the engine’s
processes and may reveal something about the activities inside the engine – but, crucially, that has
zero effect on propelling or steering the train. In this paper, we argue against the notion of conscious
thought being just the steam whistle of an engine, and for the idea that conscious thought is an
important part of the inner, causal machinery instead.
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We concede that it is not obvious how mental events
such as conscious thoughts and feelings could influence the
physical world. However, it is likely that these unknowns largely
reflect limits in knowledge of neuroscientific representations of
consciousness. That neuroscience has yet to fully understand
the neurological underpinnings of consciousness, in our view,
indicates nothing about whether consciousness is causal. Rather,
it provides all the more reason to study how and why
consciousness evolved and seems inseparable from many of the
most sophisticated human behaviors.
There are compelling philosophical objections to
epiphenomenalism (see Robinson, 2015). But those arguments
have been made before, and we are not philosophers, so they
are not our focus. Instead, in this brief essay, we summarize a
number of psychological objections to the epiphenomenalist
view of consciousness. Like the epiphenomenalists, we reject
the naïve everyday impression that conscious thoughts are
wholly able to dictate actions – but unlike them, we also reject
the opposite extreme view that conscious thought is a feckless
epiphenomenon. Instead, we affirm the conclusion made by a
systematic review of experimental studies by Baumeister et al.
(2011): Most human behaviors, especially most meaningful
actions (thus excluding reflexes and the like), are the result of
both conscious and unconscious processes, both of which are
neurologically represented in the brain. By consciousness, we
mean conscious thought, mental processes that take place within
reflective consciousness and awareness and that are by default
not functional without consciousness. Conscious thoughts are
distinguished from other mental processes by the fact that the
person can report on them to others, and indeed Baumeister and
Masicampo (2010) proposed that the ability to communicate
thoughts to other people was a main reason for consciousness to
evolve. The human mind is adaptively designed to benefit from
both conscious and unconscious processes, typically operating
in concert. Consciousness is a necessary requisite to complex
human behavior, even if its effects are mostly indirect. Hence,
we shall conclude that the way forward is to understand how
conscious and unconscious processes work together interactively
to cause behavior.
CONSCIOUSNESS CAUSING BEHAVIOR
The question of whether consciousness causes behavior
was answered with a resounding no by Huxley’s (1874)
“steam whistle” hypothesis. Many researchers have also
interpreted Libet’s (e.g., Libet’s 1985, 2004) work as favoring
an epiphenomenalism of the mind and conscious will (e.g.,
Wegner, 2002), though this conclusion is not actually supported
by that work (e.g., Mele, 2009; Papanicolaou, 2017). Libet’s
results might question the proximal power of conscious thought
(i.e., direct action control) but still leave open distal effects
of conscious thought, as demonstrated by Libet’s (1985) own
model of a conscious veto-capacity. Seeming to support the
epiphenomenalist position that consciousness lacks causal force,
some psychological researchers such as (e.g., Bargh, 1997, 2006;
Bargh and Chartrand, 1999) have proposed that all behavior is
caused by unconscious processes and that the role of conscious
thinking is, if not utterly zero, at least quite minimal and
peripheral.
But does consciousness really play no causal role? It seems
wildly implausible that human conscious thought evolved purely
as a side effect, with no adaptive benefits depending on its
ability to guide behavior. Conscious thought is observed most
obviously among humans, the one species that also happens to
be taking over the planet. Most likely, conscious thought is one
reason for humankind’s success. Conscious thought facilitates
complex human culture, our most adaptive survival strategy
(Baumeister, 2005) – it promotes coherent communication
(Baumeister and Masicampo, 2010), the spread of essential
information through the group (Baumeister et al., 2018b), and
consideration of the future and subsequent planning (Baumeister
et al., 2018a).
Moreover, consciousness seems to depend on the interplay
between cerebral cortex and other brain regions. The activity
of these extensive brain regions is metabolically costly (Baars
and Gage, 2010; Baars, 2012; Howarth et al., 2012). Conscious
thought has considerable information processing costs due to its
limited capacity, from which many disadvantages can result (e.g.,
distractibility, slow reactions; see Baars, 2012). It is implausible to
assume that such a costly adaptation would have been selected for
if it did not confer large compensatory benefits to the self and the
group.
When understanding consciousness as a necessary part
or condition of processes that lead to functional outcomes,
consciousness qualifies as a cause in Mackie’s (1974) INUS
model of causation. Real-world phenomena (such as social
behavior) consist of complex constellations in which many
factors contribute to one effect. A causal factor is therefore
defined as an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary
but Sufficient condition (INUS). This means, for instance, that
the conscious intention to murder someone alone is not sufficient
for murder to happen. Many other conditions come into play as
well to sufficiently create the effect (murder), such as a suitable
weapon, a situational opportunity, and the lack of adequate self-
protection by the victim. But the intention is often one crucial
factor, without which the murder would not take place. Hence,
following Mackie’s (1974) analysis, consciousness represents an
epistemologically necessary – and thus causal – part of many
complex behaviors.
VARIETIES OF CAUSATION BY
CONSCIOUS THOUGHTS
Taking up the challenge to respond to the ephiphenomenalists,
from Huxley (1874) up to the many who mistakenly think
Libet proved conscious thought to lack causal power, Baumeister
et al. (2011) surveyed the research literature in psychology for
evidence of conscious causation of behavior. Scientists recognize
experiments as the best method for testing causal theories.
Therefore, Baumeister et al. (2011) searched for experiments that
manipulated some conscious thought or feeling as independent
variable and subsequently measured behavior as dependent
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variable. Any significant effects would indicate that the conscious
thought or feeling caused behavior.
Their search uncovered a huge amount of evidence indicating
conscious causation of behavior. Interested readers are referred
to that review (Baumeister et al., 2011), and here, we merely
summarize briefly the kinds of evidence for conscious events,
thoughts, and feelings causing behavior.
Mentally (consciously) imagining specific actions increases
the likelihood that they will be enacted. Mentally practicing
sports and other skills improves subsequent performance.
Some expectancies may be unconscious, but still, conscious
expectancies do alter behavior. Deliberate planning changes
and usually improves behavioral outcomes. Consciously forming
specific “implementation intentions” (Gollwitzer, 1999) increases
the likelihood that the desired action will be performed. How
people think about recent events, and how much they think about
them, alters how they act. Manipulating how people consciously
think about themselves, for better or worse, has been shown
to produce a wide range of consequences. People have many
automatic responses, but conscious effort can block and override
them. Changing the conscious mental framing of a task, including
things like changing what one’s goal is, has been shown to alter
multiple behaviors.
Several groups of research findings emphasized social uses
of consciousness, and indeed there is a reasonable case that
human consciousness evolved to serve interpersonal functions
(Baumeister and Masicampo, 2010). Mentally simulating another
person’s perspective does wonders for interpersonal harmony,
though it can also be used strategically to gain competitive
advantage. In negotiation (a form of interactive decision that
is unique to humankind), consciously simulating the other
side’s perspective has been shown to be widely influential and
mostly helpful. Furthermore, empathy and perspective taking
are important assets for ethical reasoning and moral behavior,
especially in the current globalized social culture. It can be argued
that these processes involve conscious thought and even need
conscious awareness to come into being in the first place (see
Haladjian and Montemayor, 2016).
Conscious thought is also necessary for logical reasoning (e.g.,
DeWall et al., 2008). Conscious beings use logical reasoning
to their benefit. Scientific theories, for example, are mental
constructs that depend on logic and have vastly influenced the
physical world we live in Popper and Eccles (1977).
Another such phenomenon requiring conscious thought is
talking, that is, coherent verbal communication (Baumeister
and Masicampo, 2010). Consciousness is apparently required
for integrating words into sentences, stories, and more. Via
speech, members of groups share information, build a collectively
shared stock of information, make group plans and execute them,
devise cultural rituals, cope collectively with novel threats and
opportunities, and evaluate (and thus learn from) each other.
Indeed, the advantages of talking would seemingly be alone
sufficient to explain the evolutionarily adaptive advantage of
consciousness. If two hominid groups competed, and only one of
them could talk, the talkers would have a substantial advantage
in planning, coordinating, group decision, and other factors.
Hence, consciousness appears to be a necessary condition of these
processes, therefore qualifying as a cause in Mackie’s (1974) INUS
model of causation.
WHAT CONSCIOUS THOUGHT CAN AND
CANNOT DO
Several crucial themes and limitations of consciousness were
noted by Baumeister et al. (2011). In general, the effects of
conscious thinking were indirect. The most direct interventions
produced negative effects, like choking under pressure, which
occurs because the performer tries to supervise consciously
the execution of an automatized skill (Baumeister, 1984).
Unconscious, automatic causes may often be the proximal causes
of action – but conscious thought is a powerful upstream cause,
and it seems the farther upstream, the better.
Nothing showed that consciousness can produce behavior by
itself. Obviously, if the conscious mind decides to walk toward
a certain direction, control is handed off to the unconscious
processes of walking. The proximal execution of behavior
as physical movement is mainly, perhaps even exclusively,
unconscious and automatic. If consciousness has any causal
impact, it is far upstream from the actual firings of nerve cells
to activate muscles to move. Hence the conclusion that almost
all human behavior stems from a combination of conscious and
unconscious processes.
Consciousness was especially found to be necessary
in situations that had multiple possible outcomes, the “matrix of
maybe” (Baumeister et al., 2018a). The relevance of consciousness
to such situations may reflect that people use their conscious
thoughts to imagine various possible futures and to calculate how
their own actions might lead to these good and bad outcomes.
Hence they alter their behavior based on how they have mentally
simulated various future outcomes.
FREE ACTION AND CONSCIOUS
THOUGHT
Debates on the causal power of consciousness often become
entangled with debates about human freedom of action. But
these are different questions. It is entirely possible that conscious
thoughts could have powerful and extensive causal impact in the
complete absence of free will and free action.
Still, there is some overlap. Insofar as decision freedom
exists, it presumably relies on conscious causation. Hardly
anyone has seriously developed a theory of unconscious freedom
(cf. Heisenberg, 2009). Most conceptions of naturalistic free
will and decision freedom include conscious processing, like
self-reflection, as a necessary component (Lau and Hiemisch,
2017; also Fromm, 1964; Johnson-Laird, 1988; Hájicˇek, 2009).
A reflective process enables considering multiple possibilities,
cognitive flexibility, and the chance to incorporate higher values
and abstract meanings into guiding action. The epiphenomenalist
challenge thus implies that freedom could be ruled out as well as
conscious causation, if conscious thought should turn out to be
causally trivial.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 October 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1925
fpsyg-09-01925 October 5, 2018 Time: 18:25 # 4
Baumeister et al. The Necessity of Consciousness
Epiphenomenalism might discourage researchers from
investigating adaptive forms of human freedom in relation
to laypersons’ conscious experiences of it. For example, our
work has revealed a mismatch between philosophical theories
about decision freedom and laypersons’ self-reports of decision
freedom. Lau et al. (2015) reported a series of experiments
measuring how free people felt while making various decisions.
The experiments manipulated a host of variables that theorists
have linked to free action: number and diversity of options,
uncertainty about future outcome, competing reasons, (absence
of) time pressure, lack of a clear best option, difficulty of
deciding, and the like. These generally made no difference or
in some cases detracted from feelings of freedom rather than
increasing it. Instead, people reported feeling freest when they
obtained a positive outcome with minimal effort.
In our view, these results raise interesting questions for free
will research, especially on the alignment of theories of free
choice and folk psychology. Presumably the free and conscious
contemplation of options represents an evolutionarily new and
powerful way of making good choices, one that especially
facilitates coping with the ambiguities of complex cultural
life. The conscious self can carry out decision processes that
are beyond what simple, automatic processes can do. Free
choice should therefore be slow, effortful, and difficult (Lau
and Hiemisch, 2017). Yet, people experience it directly the
opposite way – they seem to feel freest when they can get
what they want, quickly and easily. This suggests that laypeople
possibly misrepresent (and misunderstand) the nature of free
choice. Although attaining desirable outcomes is a part of
free actions (Stillman et al., 2011), people seem to fantasize
that one should always get the best option and move easily
from joy to joy. If that were possible, humankind would not
seemingly need the sophisticated mental and brain apparatus for
complex processing. To freely control and steer one’s life includes
facing uncertainty and resolving incompatible demands. Ruling
out conscious causation a priori (and thus ruling out human
freedom) discourages this kind of work that raises important
questions for understanding the human experience of freedom.
BELIEFS ABOUT FREE WILL
People’s beliefs about free will represent one conscious cognition,
indeed one that can be manipulated by conscious thought
processes (Vohs and Schooler, 2008; Alquist et al., 2013a,b;
Shariff et al., 2014) and conscious contemplation of conscious
thought processes (e.g., Clark et al., 2017; Vonasch et al., 2017).
For example, belief in free will dwindles when people read
arguments that it does not exist, that neural evidence of a
decision precedes conscious awareness of that decision, or that
conscious free choice is an illusion. Moreover, these beliefs
have behavioral consequences (particularly, a variety of prosocial
and antisocial consequences), thus providing further support
for the causal efficacy of conscious thoughts (for reviews, see
Baumeister and Brewer, 2012; Baumeister and Monroe, 2014).
These findings are particularly relevant to epiphenomenalism,
because they show that conscious beliefs in free will (something
that epiphenomenalists would argue does not exist in the physical
world) have behavioral consequences.
Why do people believe in free will? Experiments by Clark et al.
(2014, 2017) confirmed one reason. They showed that people
increase their broad beliefs in human free will when they wish
to punish others and to justify their punitive responses. These fit
Nietzsche’s (1889/1954) speculation that the notion of free will
was invented to create human moral responsibility, so that people
could justifiably blame and punish their neighbors for misdeeds.
Societies made up of citizens who believed in free will and who
were correspondingly harshly punitive presumably flourished in
comparison to and in competition with societies that failed to
punish misbehavior.
Thus, conscious beliefs in free will generally make people
behave prosocially, and these beliefs are used to justify punishing
people who behave antisocially. The implication is that both the
belief in free will and the reality (such as it may be) of free
will improve human interaction in ways that lead to broadly
beneficial, adaptive outcomes.
A CHALLENGE TO
EPIPHENOMENALISTS
The special issue’s theme is the epiphenomenalist challenge to
theories of conscious causation and free will. It claims that
conscious thought has no causal power. We end by issuing
a reciprocal challenge to the one set forth by this special
issue. We challenge proponents of this view to conduct their
experiments without relying on conscious causation (e.g., for
instructions, informed consent). We think this is unfeasible
because conscious processes are a necessary condition for many
behaviors, particularly social ones. On a pragmatic note, it is
likely not conducive to scientific discovery to rule out conscious
causation a priori. How can one empirically study an alternate
(and likely impossible) reality in which consciousness does not
co-occur with its neural correlates?
If we proceed to explain behavior only in terms of neuronal
events, like eliminative materialists call for, what exactly are the
causal units or factors and on which level of resolution can we
describe them (e.g., neuronal, atomic, subatomic)? A vast body
of knowledge about the brain shows that “neural activity” can
be understood as the activity of lobe regions, of clusters and
networks, or as the workings and interplay of (billions of) single
neurons. All of these levels of explanation can be causal, but
the lower level correlates of consciousness are confounded with
consciousness itself, which is also causal insofar as it is a necessary
component of complex behaviors (see section “Consciousness
Causing Behavior”). Conscious experience is a concise concept
with pragmatic benefits for explaining human behavior. Imagine
the absurdity of trying to furnish an explanation of the worldwide
economic crisis of 2008–2009, or the First World War, or
the rise of Islam, purely in terms of neuronal activity. As
this reasoning should convey, we believe that the qualitative
differences between mind and brain alone serve to counter
and qualify the notion of an epiphenomenalism of mental
events.
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To be sure, we welcome the epiphenomenalistic challenge of this
special issue as it inspires critical discussion and exciting new
experiments. However, we believe that psychological phenomena
are complex to such a degree that we should keep investigating
all facets (conscious thought, unconscious cognition, brain
mechanics). Instead of reducing one to the other a priori, we
should focus on their interplay in the causation of experience and
behavior.
CONCLUSION
Everyday experience supports the impression that conscious
thoughts guide and control behavior. By definition, one is not
conscious of unconscious processes, and so one cannot easily
appreciate them. Nevertheless, scientific research has confirmed
the ubiquitous operation and importance of unconscious
processes for human action. The exact causal sequences for
conscious processing are similarly, mysterious, but nonetheless,
as we have covered with ample research, including rigorous
laboratory experiments, conscious thoughts also help cause
behavior. Unlike the unrealistic and contrived scenario in Libet’s
experiments, in which all uses of conscious thought were carefully
ruled out (e.g., by instructions not to plan), we think ordinary
human action relies heavily on conscious reasoning, conscious
understanding, conscious explanation and communication, and
the conscious processes of reaching agreement, operating in
concert with various other levels of causation.
The human capacity for conscious thought, including
conscious communication, is a major reason for the
unprecedented sociocultural achievements of humankind. Rather
than ruling out conscious causality a priori, future research may
profit from adopting a more moderate position and aiming to
elucidate how conscious and other causal processes complement
each other in guiding human action.
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